The groundwork for Egypt and Tunisia’s days of rage took years. In isolated Syria, there is much grassroots work to be done A “day of rage” called for by Syrian opposition members living abroad and scheduled for last Friday and Saturday came and went: the only mass presence detected on the streets of major cities in Syria was that of security forces. The sheer size of security presence tells us that the ruling regime was indeed concerned, but obviously so were the Syrian people and the grassroots activists who were supposed to lead the way. The balance of terror that has characterised life in the police state that is Syria over the past five decades continued to dictate the pace of life. Syria is definitely not Tunisia or Egypt. True, the country suffers from the same problems of unemployment, inflation, corruption, nepotism and authoritarian rule, but structurally Syria is defined by additional facts that need to be taken into account. Fact 1: Syria has a rather heterogeneous population divided along national, religious, sectarian, regional and socioeconomic lines. The ruling regime survives by manipulating mutual suspicions between these groups and their complex history. Syria’s ruling family, the Assads, come from the minority Alawite sect, which makes up less than 10% of the population. The elite striking units within the country’s armed forces, especially the Republican Guard , have a membership drawn almost exclusively from the Alawite community. These units are tasked primarily with ensuring the survival of the ruling regime and have no other national agenda to speak of. As such, in a showdown between regime and people, neutrality will not be much of an option – not unless the protesters are completely nonviolent and include critical representation from all communities, especially the Alawites. Barring such a development, the country could easily be sunk into the kind of showdowns that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which culminated in the famous Hama massacre that left more than 20,000 Syrians dead. Another 25,000 people have since “disappeared”. Fact 2: Syria finds itself at the intersection of a regional power grab involving Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and, more recently, Turkey. None of these regional players seems necessarily keen on a change of leadership in Syria, especially if this change should come as a result of a popular grassroots uprising. While Israel’s only viable means of preventing such an uprising from taking place is lobbying its allies in the west to ease off their pressures on the Assads, Iran does not operate under such restrictions. There is nothing to prevent its leaders from supporting their allies the Assads with militias and weapons should the need arise. Turkey will view with suspicion any regional change that further underscores the need for addressing the Kurdish question in a more drastic manner than has already been done. As for Saudi Arabia, the kingdom’s aversion to revolutions and the unpredictability of grassroots-inspired change is well documented and seems to trump any other consideration. Fact 3: Syria is still suffering from the isolation it has experienced since the 1980s. As a result, the exposure of its people to the world outside their borders is relatively weak, at least in comparison with the situation in Tunisia and Egypt. Consequently, there are really no independent civil society institutions to speak of: no free unions, no independent student bodies, no active political opposition parties – in short, no structures that could enable people to organise themselves and rally others. More importantly, the international community has little leverage with Syria’s rulers, who have routinely shrugged off mediation efforts by a variety of diplomatic envoys. Fact 4: Syria has already witnessed a power transition, back in 2000. The current president, Bashar al-Assad, has had more than a decade now to consolidate his grip on power and put people loyal to him in all the right places. As such, this is no longer an ailing regime or one in mid-transition, but one in the full swing of things – one that has already survived a trial by fire in the period between 2003 and 2008, which came as result of American pressure. This regime will not easily fracture now. These facts, among others, make Syria a tough nut to crack if its glaring particularities are not taken seriously and factored into the thinking of those bent on cracking it. Personally, and as a Syrian democracy activist who believes that the natural place for our current leaders is a dark and damp prison cell where they can rot for the rest of their lives, there is nothing I would like to see more. But it is for this reason that I should caution my colleagues against getting too caught up in the emotional upheavals generated by the current goings-on in Tunisia and Egypt. For while the events might seem surprising, in reality they come as a culmination of years of on-the-ground preparations and exposure to external realities that played a key role in making young people aware of the possibilities, opportunities and alternatives that exist for them. If we are to draw inspiration from these events, as we should, let it be the right one: we need to work on charting a clearer vision for the future of our country and adopt effective communications strategies with our people that can enable us to bust the various myths that the regime has spread over the years. So long as minority communities in the country still believe that the Assads are their protectors, rather than the pariahs who amplify and prey on their fears, and so long as many of our young still believe that the Assads are true believers in resistance ideology rather than manipulators of it, we will have minimal chance to incite our people to rise up. More importantly, we should also accept that the real leadership role here is to be played by the grassroots activists scattered throughout the country. They are the ones who will have to decide when the right moment has come for us to have our day of anger. Syria Middle East Tunisia Egypt Protest Ammar Abdulhamid guardian.co.uk
Continue reading …Cable dated:2006-01-29T11:49:00 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000493 SIPDIS FOR THE DIRECTOR FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016 TAGS: PTER, KCRM, PREL, EG SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER’S VISIT TO EGYPT REF: 05 CAIRO 8938 Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Director Mueller, 1. (C) Thank you for rescheduling your visit to Egypt. The Egyptians will welcome you warmly, but you should be aware of some shifts in the political context and atmospherics of our relationship with Egypt since we last updated you in December (reftel). Several internal developments in the past eight weeks have put a strain on our bilateral ties, although the core of our partnership in law enforcement and mutual security affairs remains solid. 2. (S) Your visit presents an opportunity to review and upgrade our law enforcement/intelligence cooperation with the Egyptians. The CIA has a strong and growing relationship with the Egyptian Intelligence Service (EGIS). We believe your visit can help the FBI to establish a similarly robust and productive partnership with the State Security Investigative Service. Although they see the national interest in improving law enforcement cooperation, leaders like Omar Soliman, Interior Minister Adly, SSIS Director Abdel Rahman and especially President Mubarak–all of whom we expect you will meet–remain suspicious of our intent. On our side, we should be ready with concrete proposals to advance practical cooperation in law enforcement. Exchange of forensic and biometric data and associated upgrades of Egypt’s capabilities in this field could provide a good beginning. 3. (C) Three developments in the past eight weeks have altered the political context. First, widespread irregularities and violence marred the parliamentary elections which concluded on December 8, drawing criticism from both domestic and international quarters, including the United States. Second, the December 24 conviction and jailing of opposition leader Ayman Nour, was an unconvincingly disguised act of political repression. Third, the December 29 operation by GOE security forces (who fall under the authority of Interior Minister Adly) to disperse a large group of Sudanese refugees squatting in a downtown park went badly awry, with 27 Sudanese dead. All three security-related incidents have undermined Mubarak’s credibility as a leader of democratic reforms, and has strained our ties with Egypt. The bedrock of our strategic interests with Egypt, however, remains as important as ever. 4. (C) After a long period of quiet, the specter of terrorism returned to Egypt in late 2004. Interior Minister Adly, and State Security Director Hassan Abdel Rahman, have now seen three major terrorist incidents on their watch: — The bombing of three resorts in the Sinai, October 2004; — The bombing at a major Cairo tourist market, April 2005; and — The Sharm el-Sheikh bombing, July 2005. 5. (C) Not withstanding these terrorist attacks and the MOI’s role in the election problems and Sudanese refugee deaths, Interior Minister Adly held on to his seat in the late December cabinet shuffle, and will remain a key interlocutor for us in the foreseeable future. Adly is an old-school, conservative security man, highly skeptical of any form of democratic political opening that might impact traditional MOI SoPs. But he has been very cooperative with us in most operational areas of security and law enforcement. 6. (C) We hope you will stress our interest in expanding technical cooperation, generally in your meeting with President Mubarak, and more specifically in your meetings with the Minister of Interior and the State Security Director. For example, Egypt should be a leading candidate for the FBI’s initiative to upgrade sharing of fingerprint and other biometric data on suspected terrorists and other criminals. Now that Washington has identified a funding source we hope you will be able to tell the Egyptians that we are ready to move forward with this project, which would include extensive training and equipment upgrades for Egyptian personnel. In addition, we hope you will invite State Security Director Hassan Abdel Rahman to bring a high level delegation to Washington to visit FBI HQ and the Quantico training facilities early this year. We expect that once he sees what the FBI can offer and establishes some personal contact, he will be more forthcoming with intelligence cooperation on their side. Not withstanding his suspicions, he probably would welcome an offer from you to expand training opportunities for Egyptian personnel at the FBI Academy. 7. (C) Until recently, the GOE was reluctant to discuss publicly the issue of Trafficking in Persons (TIP), which as you know has taken on a high policy profile in Washington. However, on January 23, Egyptian First Lady Suzanne Mubarak delivered the keynote address at an international conference on TIP in Athens, denouncing the practice and calling for stronger international coordination to combat it. Particularly if you meet Mubarak, you may wish to compliment Egypt and Mrs. Mubarak in particular, for taking on an unaccustomed new role as an outspoken advocate against TIP and reiterate USG interest in cooperating with Egypt in this campaign. 8. (C) The November-December parliamentary elections resulted in a five-fold increase in the number of seats held by independent candidates representing the outlawed but tolerated Muslim Brotherhood. The GOE has a long history of threatening us with the MB bogeyman. Your counterparts may try to suggest that the President,s insistence on greater democracy in Egypt is somehow responsible for the MB,s electoral success,and may even try to draw a cautionary example out of Hamas’ January 25 election victory. (The GOE sees Hamas, with fair reason, as spawned by the MB.) We do not accept the proposition that Egypt’s only choices are a slow-to-reform authoritarian regime or an Islamist extremist one; nor do we see greater democracy in Egypt as leading necessarily to a government under the MB. The images of intimidation and fraud that have emerged from the recent elections favor the Islamist extremists whom we both oppose. The best way to counter narrow-minded Islamist politics is to open the system. If the Egyptians are willing, the FBI could serve as a resource and partner, among other U.S. agencies and programs, in professionalizing the Egyptian security services and modernizing their investigative techniques. This would enhance the credibility of the security apparatus and remove an arrow from the Islamists, quiver. 9. (C) We believe the Egyptians will welcome your visit as a serious effort to enhance our law enforcement cooperation, and another mark–only three weeks after VP Cheney’s visit–of the American recognition of the value of our larger partnership across the board. RICCIARDONE Egypt The US embassy cables US foreign policy guardian.co.uk
Continue reading …Cable dated:2005-11-29T14:19:00 C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 008938 SIPDIS FOR THE DIRECTOR FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 TAGS: PTER, KCRM, PREL, EG, OVIP, Visits SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER’S VISIT TO EGYPT Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Director Mueller, 1. (C) Thank you for including Cairo in your travel to the Middle East. Your visit presents an opportunity to review and upgrade our law enforcement/intelligence cooperation with the Egyptians. The CIA already has a strong and growing relationship with the Egyptian Intelligence Service (EGIS). We would like the FBI to establish a similarly robust and productive partnership with the State Security Investigative Service. The Ministry does not yet recognize the benefit for their side of enhanced ties with the FBI. But leaders like Omar Soliman and especially President Mubarak, with whom we hope you will be able to meet, have the vision and influence to overcome these reservations. On our side, we should be ready with concrete proposals to kick start new levels of practical cooperation. Exchange of forensic and biometric data and associated upgrades of Egypt’s capabilities in this field could provide a good beginning. 2. (C) The return of the specter of terrorism in Egypt in late 2004, following seven years of safety is seen here as a wake-up call to the Egyptian security forces. Interior Minister El Adly, and State Security Director Hassan, — you will meet both — have now seen three major terrorist incidents on their watch: — The bombing of three resorts in the Sinai, October 2004 — The bombing at a major Cairo tourist market, April 2005 — The Sharm el-Sheikh bombing, July 2005; 3. (C) El Adly may lose his job over the Sharm bombings as well as the mis-management of the current Parliamentary elections. As a result, you may find the Egyptians more receptive to a U.S. initiative to upgrade our law-enforcement cooperation. 4. (C) One specific area of cooperation that I understand is under consideration is sharing of fingerprint and other biometric data on suspected terrorists and other criminals. This could involve training and equipment upgrades for Egyptian personnel. This is a terrific initiative. In addition, you should urge State Security Director Hassan to bring a high level delegation to Washington to visit FBI HQ and the Quantico training facilities early in 2006. Once he sees what the FBI can offer and establishes some personal contact, he will be more forthcoming with intelligence cooperation on their side. I hope you will also consider offering to continue and ideally expand training opportunities for Egyptian personnel at the FBI Academy. 5. (C) Your arrival in Egypt coincides with the end of a month-long series of parliamentary elections, in which the outlawed but tolerated Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has made substantial gains. The elections have been conducted in three rounds. The final run-offs will be held on December 7. The ruling NDP will retain the super majority it needs to control the legislative agenda, but with the MB holding as much as 20 percent of the seats, atmospherics and tone of debate will probably change dramatically. 6. (C) The Egyptians have a long history of threatening us with the MB bogeyman. Your counterparts may try to suggest that the President,s insistence on greater democracy in Egypt is somehow responsible for the MB,s electoral success. You should push back that, on the contrary, the MB,s rise signals the need for greater democracy and transparency in government. The images of intimidation and fraud that have emerged from the recent elections favor the extremists both we and the Egyptian government oppose. The best way to counter narrow-minded Islamist politics is to open the system. The FBI could serve as a resource and partner ) if indeed you are willing — in professionalizing the Egyptian security services and modernizing their investigative techniques. This would enhance the credibility of the security apparatus and remove an arrow from the Islamists, quiver. 7. (C) At the end of the day, we believe you can best pitch your visit as a serious effort to enhance our law enforcement cooperation. Both sides are absolutely committed to defeating violent extremists, and both sides can take more tangible steps toward meeting this goal. RICCIARDONE Egypt The US embassy cables US foreign policy guardian.co.uk
Continue reading …Cable dated:2007-10-25T08:47:00 S E C R E T CAIRO 003126 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EG, IQ SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CROCKER’S VISIT TO CAIRO Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION STUART JONES. REASONS: 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (S) Welcome to Cairo. 2. (S) Cairo-Baghdad Relations: The Egyptian leadership wants assurances that the USG will not withdraw from Iraq precipitously. The Egyptians were also taken aback by Senate resolution on sectarian division, which got broad press play here. The GOE has played a constructive role in the expanded neighbors forum. Mubarak hosted the group in Sharm el Sheikh in May and Aboul Gheit will join the Istanbul meeting. The GOE dislikes and distrusts PM al Maliki, but stops short of calling for his removal, so far, even in private. Vice President Abdel Mahdi was received warmly in September and made a positive impression. 3. (S) The best thing the Baghdad can do now to improve relations with Cairo is appoint a full-time Ambassador. The GOE is still stung by the August 2005 assassination of its emissary, Ihab el-Sharif, but has made noises about appointing an Ambassador to Baghdad resident in Cairo. 4. (C) Egypt has a strong record on intelligence liaison and blocking foreign fighters en route to Iraq. This has included several arrests here. You may wish to praise Egypt’s help and also ask how the Egyptians regard the problem of Syria transit. Egyptian has not experienced the huge refugee influx of Iraq’s neighbors but the approximately 200,000 displaced Iraqis are a source of anxiety and concern. The Egyptians want to be involved in any refugee solution. 4. (C) DEBT: The Egyptians are not accustomed to forgiving other countries’ debts and regard the Iraqis as oil-rich. MFA reportedly has the portfolio to negotiate the debt issue, but most of the debt is held by MOD, which is not engaged. The parties have discussed a compromise that the GOE would forgive official debt — approximately $700m — if the Iraqis paid off their private debt, owed mainly to Egyptian workers who had worked in Iraq, estimated at approximately $400m. But there is considerable dispute over the figures and the Iraqis seem no more eager than the Egyptians to close a deal. We expect this process to drag on for some time. 5. (S) IRAN: The Egyptians dismiss news reports that the GOE is moving towards normalization with Iran. Aboul Gheit met with his Iranian counterpart on the margins of UNGA. Omar Soliman takes an especially hard line on Tehran and frequently refers to the Iranians as “devils.” But bilateral contacts are on the rise. Soliman will press you for an assessment of Iranian activity in Iraq and also of al Maliki’s ties to Tehran. Mubarak and Soliman are furious about Bashar Al Assad’s collaboration with Iran. They want the USG to improve relations with Damascus to lure Bashar back to the Arab fold. But Egyptian influence is very limited and Cairo is out of ideas. 6. (S) Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa is one of the few Arab leaders to serially visit Baghdad. (Aboul Gheit will not go). The Arab League has exchanged ambassadors with Baghdad. You may wish to enlist Moussa in efforts to increase Arab diplomatic representation in Baghdad. 7. (C) Moussa met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan October 18, and reportedly advised against Turkish intervention in northern Iraq, taking the view that Iraq had enough issues to deal with already. A key Arab League contact told us October 18 he was confident that the Turks will not enter northern Iraq, but noted the idea (apparently proposed by Maliki) of a joint Turkish-Iraqi force to address Turkish concerns would not be unreasonable so long as the two governments agreed to it. RICCIARDONE Egypt Iran The US embassy cables US foreign policy Middle East guardian.co.uk
Continue reading …Hamas has been in power in Gaza for four years, and is firmly entrenched in the community. The organisation’s early origins lie in the Muslim Brotherhood, neighbouring Egypt’s banned opposition group. While Egypt’s political turmoil shakes up the Middle East, Hamas could benefit if the Brotherhood becomes a rising political force following the country’s current crisis. Al Jazeera’s Nicole Johnston reports from Gaza.
Continue reading …Haroon Lorgat, the chief executive of the International Cricket Council, tells Al Jazeera that the minimum five-year bans handed out to three top Pakistan cricketers sends a clear message that corruption won’t be tolerated. The punishments given to Salman Butt, Mohammad Asif and Mohammad Amir has been criticised by some as too leniant. But the independent tribunal that handed down the punishment in Qatar last week said that it would have given lighter suspensions, had it been allowed to. Rahul pathak reports from Doha.
Continue reading …What are the differences between both revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt? What are the possible ramifications? How would this impact on shaping the future in both countries? And does people’s power actually work?
Continue reading …Pro-democracy protesters in Cairo appear unmoved after talks between the Egyptian government and opposition groups. People are still gathering in Tahrir Square but the space they are allowed to occupy is getting smaller as authorities are trying to get life back to normal in the capital. Al Jazeera’s Alan Fisher reports.
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