South Korean military preparing new rules of engagement for troops as Seoul threatens tough response to any attack Around the edge of the baseball field at Camp Bonifas, South Korean marines under the United Nations Command are busy building four bomb shelters. The American and Korean troops at the camp are just 400 yards from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) that has divided North from South Korea since the 1953 armistice. It has always been a tense place, ringed by razor wire and minefields, but now there is a particular urgency to the military spadework. North Korea has carried out two major military attacks on the South in the past 15 months, and is widely believed in Seoul to be planning a third, in an attempt to extract diplomatic and economic concessions. What makes the current situation so fraught with danger – some say the most perilous moment on the Korean peninsula for a generation – is South Korea’s hardline stance. The government of President Lee Myung-bak, facing elections next year and criticism for its cautious response to the previous two incidents, is threatening to unleash a far more punishing response to any further “provocation”, setting the scene for an unpredictable tit-for-tat escalation. South Korean islands along the western maritime border, the scene of the two earlier incidents, are bristling with new weapons. Government officials in Seoul confirmed that those new defences will include Israeli-made Delilah missiles, with a range of 150 miles – enough to hit Pyongyang. The South Korean military is meanwhile preparing new rules of engagement for its frontline troops which would allow it to respond “robustly” to an attack without immediately consulting the government in Seoul. Security officials talk of “proactive deterrence”, saying any future response would no longer be proportionate, but rather punitive enough to dissuade the Kim Jong-il regime in Pyongyang from making further attacks. A South Korean counterattack would target not just the North Korean units involved in any future military action but command posts as far away as the North Korean capital. Officials in Seoul even talk of a future incident as “an opportunity” that would allow them to “restore” a working level of deterrence. But it is a high-risk strategy. “We are now in the most dangerous moment in Korean history over the last 25 years,” said Andrei Lankov, a Russian professor at Seoul’s Kookmin University. “South Korea has already committed itself to a strong reaction to a future North Korean provocation so many times and so loudly that if they don’t do it they will lose elections and be shamed. “So they will probably react. North Korea is not getting what they want [diplomatically] so they will probably use their usual trick of rising escalation. My advice to war history fans is you should think of buying a map of the Korean peninsula.” Government officials in Seoul, speaking off the record, agreed that they were braced for a North Korean “provocation”, because Pyongyang’s peace overtures of the past few months have failed to persuade Seoul, Washington or Tokyo to enter a dialogue. All three capitals insist on a North Korean apology for the two previous incidents, the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, and the bombardment of the western island of Yeonpyeong, as well as concrete steps towards dismantling the North Korean nuclear programme, as preconditions for talks. “North Korea has been trying this peace offensive for the past seven months. Now is the time for the North Koreans to change their mode towards more a conflictual approach,” a former South Korean official and government adviser predicted. Another reason Seoul expects another incident is that the regime in Pyongyang appears to be seeking to enhance the martial credentials of the heir apparent, Kim Jong-un, by flexing North Korea’s muscles. Seoul’s bellicose language and heavy investment in border defences is clearly aimed at dissuading Pyongyang from trying a repeat of the Cheonan or Yeonpyeong attacks. However, some observers doubt whether South Korea’s political leaders and military commanders, when the moment came, would actually order a response that risked triggering a full-scale war. “I don’t know if there is real political will,” the former official said. “The new order being given to commanders is ‘shoot first and then call’ [Seoul]. But I don’t know if the field commanders will shoot. Also, while the rules of engagement have changed to more proactive deterrence, looking at the current deployment of forces, I don’t think we have the ability to execute that plan.” North Korea’s next move to grab Washington’s attention may also come in another form, a third nuclear test. South Korean government experts believe Pyongyang is fully capable of carrying out such a test and argue that the decision will ultimately be political: whether it would be more likely to force concessions from a concerned international community, largely in the form of food aid, or tighten the sanctions screw on North Korea still further. In response to a nuclear test, Seoul would have no military response, and would instead have to hope that China, North Korea’s neighbour and protector, would agree to further sanctions. “China’s record so far is not encouraging,” an official conceded. While there is widespread apprehension in the region that Korea’s frozen conflict will turn hot once more in the near future, there is also general agreement that all the parties to the conflict will do their utmost to ensure there is no return to full-scale war. “Both sides are afraid of war and if they see that the probability is real they will go to a lot of highly humiliating concessions to prevent it,” Lankov said. “That is because North Korea knows that it is going to lose, and South Korean knows it is going to win but at a cost that is unacceptable, and it doesn’t know what to do if it does win.” South Korea North Korea Julian Borger guardian.co.uk